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TRUSTS: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID
DECLARATIONS OF TRUST

UNDER FLORIDA STATUTES § 689.075
Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993)
Megan Kelly*
Petitioner, as residual beneficiary of a will, filed for a determination
that a declaration of trust was ineffective to transfer trust assets to the trust
beneficiary on the testator's death.' Petitioner alleged that the inter vivos
trust contained testamentary aspects but did not comply with Florida's will
execution requirements. 2 The trial court granted petitioner's motion for
summary judgment,3 and the respondent appealed.4 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed,5 finding that Florida Statutes section
689.071(1)(g) 6 created two alternative tests to determine the validity of an
* Dedicated to my parents, Roger and Carol Kelly, and my grandparents for their continuing
support. Special thanks to Ken Lord for his encouragement and understanding.
1. Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 1993). The settlor had named herself as sole
trustee. Id.
2. Id. The trust instrument was signed before one witness, a notary public, but was not attested
to by two subscribing witnesses. Id.
3. Id. As a result of this finding, the trust assets were held to be a part of the testator's estate
and should have passed through the residuary clause to petitioner. Id.
4. Id.
5. Alter v. Zuckerman, 585 So. 2d 303, 304 (3d DCA 1991), aff'd, 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993).
6. FLA. STAT. § 689.075 (1991) reads as follows:

689.075. Inter vivos trusts; powers retained by settlor
(1) A trust which is otherwise valid, including, but not limited to, a trust the principal
of which is composed of real property, intangible personal property, tangible personal property, the possible expectancy of receiving as a named beneficiary death benefits as described in s. 733.808, or any combination thereof, and which has been created by a written
instrument shall not be held invalid or an attempted testamentary disposition for any one or
more of the following reasons:
(a) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to revoke, amend,
alter, or modify the trust in whole or in part;
(b) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to appoint by deed
or will the persons and organizations to whom the income shall be paid or the principal
distributed;
(c) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to add to, or withdraw from, the trust all or any part of the principal or income at one time or at different
times;
(d) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to remove the trustee or trustees and appoint a successor trustee or trustees;
(e) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to control the trustee or trustees in the administration of the trust;
(f) Because the settlor has retained the right to receive all or part of the income of the
trust during his life or for any part thereof;

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

inter vivos trust where the settlor is the sole trustee The district court
held that the testator's trust was valid because it satisfied the execution
requirements for an inter vivos trust, although it did not conform with the
formalities required for the execution of wills The Supreme Court of
Florida granted review,9 and HELD, Florida Statutes section
689.075(1)(g) creates not a single test, but two alternative tests to determine the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust where the settlor is the
sole trustee."
Under Florida common law, courts often regarded revocable inter
vivos trusts as testamentary and held those trusts invalid unless the trust
instrument was executed in compliance with the Statute of Wills." As a

(g) Because the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument, or thereafter
becomes, sole trustee; provided that at the time the trust instrument is executed it is either
valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the formalities for the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction.
(2) Nothing contained herein shall affect the validity of those accounts, including but
not limited to bank accounts, share accounts, deposits, certificates of deposit, savings certificates, and other similar arrangements, heretofore or hereafter established at any bank, savings and loan association, or credit union by one or more persons, in trust for one or more
other persons, which arrangements are, by their terms, revocable by the person making the
same until his death or incompetency.
(3) The fact that any one or more of the powers specified in subsection (1) are in fact
exercised once, or more than once, shall not affect the validity of the trust or its
nontestamentary character.
(4) This section shall be applicable to trusts executed before or after July 1, 1969, by
persons who are living on or after said date. However, the requirement of conformity with
the formalities for the execution of wills as found in paragraph (1)(g) shall not be imposed
upon any trust executed prior to July 1, 1969.
(5) The amendment of this section, by chapter 75-74, Laws of Florida, is intended to
clarify the legislative intent of this section at the time of its original enactment that it apply
to all otherwise valid trusts which are created by written instrument and which are not expressly excluded by the terms of this section and that no such trust shall be declared invalid
for any of the reasons stated in subsections (1) and (3) regardless of whether the trust involved or related to an interest in real property.
Id.
7. Zuckerman, 585 So. 2d at 306-07. The court found that in order to be valid, the trust need
only conform with the required formalities for the execution of an inter vivos trust or for the execution
of a will, but not both. Id. at 307.
8. Id.
9. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 661. The supreme court had jurisdiction pursuant to article V, §
3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution to answer the following question of great public importance certified by the Third District Court of Appeal: "WHETHER PARAGRAPH 689.075(l)(g), FLORIDA
STATUTES (1989) CREATES A SINGLE TEST, OR TWO ALTERNATIVE TESTS, FOR THE
VALIDITY OF AN INTER VIVOS TRUST EXECUTED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1969, WHERE
THE SETTLOR IS THE SOLE TRUSTEE?" Id. at 661-62.
10. Id. at 662.
11. See generally James A. Roth, Estate Planning in Florida: The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust,
16 U. FLA. L. REv. 34 (1963). The courts reasoned that the reservation of a life income, powers of appointment, and control over the trustee by the settlor created a mere agency arrangement between the
settlor and trustee and no actual trust. Id. at 42-43. Thus, the passage of interest or trust assets oc-
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matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed a similar issue in Hanson v. Denckla. 2 In Hanson, the plaintiff filed a petition
to determine whether the assets of a revocable trust passed through the

testator's will. 3 The testator had retained a life income as well as multiple powers over the trust, 4 and the trust assets were not to pass to the
beneficiary until the testator's death." The Florida Supreme Court found
the trust to be illusory because the settlor's retention of multiple powers,

in effect, divested the settlor of "none of her day-to-day control" over the
property or its disposal. 6 The court based its reasoning in large part on
sections 56 and 57 of the Restatement of Trusts. 7 Because the trust was
illusory, the court concluded that the instrument was a testamentary disposition and the assets could pass to the beneficiary only if will execution
requirements had been satisfied." Because these requirements had not
been fulfilled, the trust assets passed through the residuary clause of the
9

will.1

2
A decade later, in Lane v. Palmer First National Bank & Trust Co., 0
the Second District Court of Appeal distinguished Hanson and moved
away from the Florida Supreme Court's decision by upholding the validity

curfed only at the testator's death and was testamentary in nature. Id. at 43. Therefore, the trust was
invalid unless executed with the formalities of a will. Id.
12. 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956), rev'd on jurisdictionalgrounds, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Although
the court had previously upheld a revocable trust in which the settlor had retained a life estate, the
court had never before considered the cumulative effect of multiple reservations of power. Id. at 383.
13. Id. at 381.
14. Id. at 380-81. The settlor retained the power to appoint the trust beneficiaries, the power to
amend or revoke the trust agreement, and the power to appoint an advisor to the trustee. Id. at 383.
The trustee was unable to exercise many ordinary trustee functions without the written direction or
consent of the settlor's advisor. Id.
15. Id. at 380.
16. Id. at 383-84.
17. Id. at 384. Section 56 reads as follows:
Where the owner of property purports to create a trust inter vivos but no interest passes to
the beneficiary before the death of the settlor, the intended trust is a testamentary trust and
is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes relating to the validity of wills are complied with.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 56 (1935)). Section 57(g) reads as follows:
If the settlor reserves a beneficial life estate and power to revoke or modify the trust and
such power to control the trustee as to the details of the administration of the trust that the
trustee is his agent, the intended disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his
death is invalid unless the requirements of the Statute of Wills are complied with, but the
intended trust is valid so far as the beneficial life estate of the settlor is concerned.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 57(g) (1935)).
18. Id. at 381, 385.
19. Id. at 381.
20. 213 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
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of a revocable trust.2 In Lane, as in Hanson, the plaintiff sought to have
a trust declared invalid because the settlor retained control over the trust
during his lifetime.2 The Lane court grounded its reasoning in factual
distinctions between the two cases.23 More significantly, however, it recognized that the Hanson reasoning was based on the Restatement of
Trusts, which had been rewritten in 1959.24 Section 57 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts recognized that at the creation of a trust, an interest passes to a beneficiary other than the settlor despite the settlor's
retention of control and a life interest.' Therefore, the trust instrument is
not testamentary and need not conform with the requirements of the Statute of Wills in order to be valid.' Accordingly, the Second District Court
of Appeal held that the settlor's trust was valid, even though it had not
been executed with the formalities of a will. The trust assets therefore
passed outside the will.2
The factual distinctions upon which the Lane court based its reasoning' led to uncertainty as to what the courts would do when these distinctions did not exist.2 In an effort to clarify the status of revocable
trusts in Florida after Hanson and Lane,3" the Florida Legislature amended chapter 689 of the Florida Statutes by adding section 689.075 in
1969."' The retroactive addition enabled a court to uphold the validity of

21. Id. at 303.
22. Id. at 302.
23. Id. at 303. Hanson involved a power to appoint, whereas Lane did not. Id. Furthermore, the
Lane court found that the settlor did not exert day-to-day control as measured by the frequent exercise
of the power of appointment in Hanson. Id.
24. Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959). Section 57 reads as follows:
Where an interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary other than the settlor, the
disposition is not testamentary and invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of
the Statute of Wills merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life interest or because
he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in whole or in part, and a power to
modify the trust, and a power to control the trustee as to the administration of the trust.
Id.
26. See id.
27. Lane, 213 So. 2d at 303.
28. See supra note 23.
29. See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 664-65 (Grimes, J., dissenting); see also James S. Roth, Rebirth of the Revocable Trust in Florida,44 FLA. B.J. 82, 83 (1970) (explaining as drafter that the
statute was meant to address this uncertainty).
30. See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 665 (Grimes, J., dissenting); see also Roth, supra note 29, at
83.
31. Ch. 69-192, §§ 1-2, at 767-68, Laws of Fla. (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 689.075
(1991)). Laws of Florida, chapter 69-192 reads as follows:
AN ACT relating to declarations of trust; amending chapter 689, Florida Statutes, by adding section 689.075 to list powers that may be retained by the settlor of an inter vivos trust,
either singly or jointly with another, without affecting its nontestamentary character; provid-
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a revocable trust despite the settlor's retention of various controls and
benefits as long as the trust was otherwise valid.32 The trust was not to
be considered an attempted testamentary disposition because such power
and control remained with the settlor.33 However, subsection (2) of the
statute created an additional requirement when settlors named themselves
sole trustee.' On that occasion, subsection (2) required that a trust com-

ply with the will execution formalities existing at the time and in the jurisdiction in which the trust was created." Thus, the amendment generally
followed the concepts set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, but
diverged to require settlors who named themselves sole trustee to comply
with will execution requirements.36

ing for retroactive application to trusts executed by persons living on the effective date of
this act; providing an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Chapter 689, Florida Statutes, is amended by adding section 689.075, to read:
689.075 Inter vivos trusts; powers retained by settlor.(1) An otherwise valid trust which has been created by a written instrument shall not be
held invalid or an attempted testamentary disposition for any of the following reasons:
(a) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to revoke, amend,
alter, or modify the trust in whole or in part;
(b) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to appoint by deed
or will the persons and organizations to whom the income shall be paid or the principal
distributed;
(c) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to add to, or withdraw from, the trust all or any part of the principal or income at one (1) time or at different
times;
(d) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to remove the trustee or trustees and appoint a successor trustee or trustees;
(e) Because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to control the trustee or trustees in the administration of the trust;
(f) Because the settlor has retained the right to receive all or part of the income of the
trust during his life or for any part thereof;
(g) Because the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument, or thereafter
becomes, sole trustee.
(2) When the settlor is made sole trustee, the trust instrument shall be executed in accordance with the formalities for the execution of wills required at the time of the execution
of the trust instrument in the jurisdiction where the trust instrument is executed.
(3) The fact that any one or more of the powers specified in subsection (1) are in fact
exercised once, or more than once, shall not affect the validity of the trust or its
nontestamentary character.
Section 2. This act shall become effective on July 1, 1969 and shall be applicable to
trusts executed before or after said date by persons who are living on or after said date.
Id.
32. See id. § 2; see also Roth, supra note 29, at 83-84.
33. Ch. 69-192, § 1, at 767-68, Laws of Fla.; see supra note 31; see also Roth. supra note 29, at
84.
34. Ch. 69-192, § 1, at 768. Laws of Fla.; see supra note 31; see also Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at
665-66 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
35. Ch. 69-192, § 1, at 768, Laws of Fla.
36. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 665 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
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Apparently addressing the issue raised in Lane 37-- discrimination
against out-of-state residents-the legislature revised section 689.075 in
1971 by repealing subsection (2) and by amending subsection (1)(g) to
include the language now at issue.3" The legislature again approved of
trusts in which the settlor was the sole trustee.39 However, section
689.075(1)(g) mandated that the trust be valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which it was executed or that it conform to the will execution
formalities of that jurisdiction.'
The legislature further revised the statute in 197541 in response to
Castellano v. Cosgrove,42 which held the retroactive application to be an
unconstitutional impairment of existing contracts.13 In the 1975 amendment, the legislature reaffirmed the application of the statute to all trusts,
including those created before July 1, 1969, the date on which the original
statute was enacted.' However, to reflect the Castellano decision, the

37. Lane, 213 So. 2d at 303 (expressing concern that trusts, valid in the jurisdictions of creation,
may be held invalid in Florida after the settlor has retired and died here); see also Zuckerman, 615 So.
2d at 666 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
38. Ch. 71-126, §§ 1-2, at 322-23, Laws of Fla. (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 689.075
(1991)). Laws of Florida chapter 71-126 reads, in relevant part:
Section 1. Paragraph (g) of subsection (1) of section 689.075, Florida Statutes, is
amended to read:
(1) An otherwise valid trust which has been created by a written instrument shall not be
held invalid or an attempted testamentary disposition for any of the following reasons:
(g) Because the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument, or thereafter
becomes, sole trustee; provided, however, that at the time the trust instrument is executed it
is either valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is executed or it is executed in
accordance with the formalitiesfor the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction.
Id. § 1. Subsection (2) was substantially revised and bears no relevance to the present issue. See id.
§ 2.
39. See id. § I; see supra note 38.
40. Ch. 71-126, § 1, at 323, Laws of Fla.; see supra note 38.
41. Ch. 75-74, §§ 1-4, at 170-72, Laws of Fla. (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 689.075
(1991)).
42. 280 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1973); see Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 667 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
43. Castellano, 280 So. 2d at 677-78.
44. See Ch. 75-74, § 1, at 171-72, Laws of Fla. Laws of Florida, chapter 75-74 reads in relevant
part:
Section 1. Section 689.075, Florida Statutes, 1974 Supplement, is amended to read:
689.075 Inter vivos trusts; powers retained by settlor.(1) A trust which is otherwise valid, including but not limited to a trust the principalof
which is composed of realproperty, intangiblepersonalproperty, tangible personalproperty, the possible expectancy of receiving as a named beneficiary death benefits as described
in s.733.808, or any combination thereof and which has been created by a written instrument shall not be held invalid or an attempted testamentary disposition for any one or more
of the following reasons:
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legislature eliminated the language which required compliance with will
execution formalities for those trusts created prior to July 1, 1969. 4"
Thus, under this amendment, the requirement to satisfy will execution formalities does not apply to trusts created before July 1, 1969.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida further expanded the
circumstances under which a revocable trust can be upheld as valid by
rejecting petitioner's argument that section 689.075(1)(g) created a single,
coterminous test.' In answering the certified question, the court clearly
established two tests to determine the validity of a revocable trust where
the settlor is the sole trustee.47 The satisfaction of either test results in a
valid trust.48 The court reasoned that section 689.075(1) requires a threshold determination that a trust instrument must be valid as a trust before
subsection (g) can be applied.49 Finding that the settlor's written instrument used words sufficient to create an "otherwise valid" trust, the court
determined that the trust fell within the scope of the statute.50
The court further reasoned that once within the scope of the statute,
the trust would be upheld as valid if it was " 'either valid under the laws
of the jurisdiction in which it [was] executed or it [was] executed in accordance with the formalities for the execution of wills required in such
jurisdiction.' "" The court examined the statutory language, found it to
contain words of common usage, and concluded that the words of section
689.075(1)(g) should be construed in their plain and ordinary meaning.52
Thus, the court held that the use of the disjunctives "either" and "or"
clearly established two alternative tests to determine the validity of an
inter vivos trust where the settlor is the sole trustee. 3 Furthermore, the

(g) Because the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument, or thereafter
becomes, sole trustee; provided that at the time the trust instrument is executed it is either
valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the formalities for the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction.
(4) This section shall be applicable to trusts executed before or after July 1, 1969 by
persons who are living on or after said date. However, the requirement of conformity with
the formalitiesfor the execution of wills asfound in subsection (1)(g) shall not be imposed
upon any trust executed prior to July 1,1969.
Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
the text
53.

Id.; see Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 667 (Grimes, L, dissenting).
Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(g) (1989)) (emphasis added by the court).
Id. Additionally, the apparent lack of ambiguous language required the court to look only to
and not to rules of construction to infer legislative intent. Id.
Id.
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court relied upon sections 56 and 57 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts5' to support its conclusion that because a present interest passed to
the beneficiary, the trust was not a "testamentary 'will substitute' " and
thus need not conform with will execution requirements. 5
In his dissent, Justice Grimes disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 689.075,56 concluding that such an interpretation would
render superfluous the language of subsection (1)(g) requiring conformity
with the formalities of will execution. 7 Justice Grimes reasoned that under the majority's construction, all trusts which passed the threshold determination of "otherwise valid" in section 689.075(1) would by necessity be
held valid under subsection (1)(g) since such trusts had to be valid in
order to come within the scope of subsection (1)(g)." The circularity of
this process led Justice Grimes to conclude that the purpose of section
689.075(1)(g) was not to create two alternative tests, but rather, one test
which applies in two different situations. 9
Justice Grimes found support for his conclusion in the legislative
history of the statute.' He reasoned that the disjunctive language added
to section 689.075(1)(g) in 197161 was included to prevent the invalidation of "otherwise valid" trusts, which were created in jurisdictions outside
Florida where compliance with will execution formalities was not required.62 Justice Grimes also pointed out that the addition of section
689.075(4) in the 1975 amendment implied the legislature's intent to require at least those trusts created in Florida after July 1, 1969, to comply
with the formalities of will execution.63
The instant court's decision reflects the trend of upholding revocable
trusts and further expands the circumstances in which a revocable trust can

54. Id. at 663-64. Section 56 reads as follows: "Where no interest in the trust property is created
in a beneficiary other than the settlor before the death of the settlor, the disposition is testamentary and
is invalid unless the requirements of the Statute of Wills are complied with." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 56 (1959). For the text of section 57, see supra note 25.
55. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663-64.
56. Id. at 664-67 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 667. For the text of FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(g), see supra note 6.
58. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 666-67 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 666. Justice Grimes quotes testimony given by a House Representative relating to
the 1971 amendment:
What this does is prevent many people who come to Florida, and this happens in a number
of cases, a person will retire, come to Florida, and within 12 months will be dead. And, this
prevents that person from dying intestate when he didn't intend to .... And that is the
only application of the law.
Id. (quoting Rep. Johnson).
61. See supra note 38; see also text accompanying note 53.
62. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 666 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 667.
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be determined valid in Florida.' The instant decision picks up where
Lane left off, completely obliterating the effect of Hanson.65 By reading
section 689.075 as a reflection of section 57 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts,' the instant court has removed almost all restrictions from the
creation of revocable trusts in which the settlor is sole trustee.67
However, by embracing the principles of sections 56 and 57 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts,68 the instant court failed to recognize
that the legislature did not adopt a mirror image of the Restatement in its
exclusion of any will execution formalities.69 The legislature included
section 689.075(2) which required trusts to conform to the formalities of
will execution when the settlor is the sole trustee. 7' The majority's finding that the statutory language is plain and unambiguous did not allow the
court to look outside the statute for assistance in interpreting the meaning
of the language.27 ' This inability or refusal to look elsewhere resulted in
the exclusion of relevant case law as the possible stimulus for legislative
action and created an interpretation circular in reasoning.' Thus, the
court only allowed itself to determine the effects of the subsequent statutory amendments in a vacuum, without regard to the surrounding circumstances.
By ignoring the circumstances surrounding the 1971 amendment of
section 689.075, 74 the instant court failed to recognize that the repeal of
section 689.075(2) and the revision of section 689.075(1)(g) may have
been in response to Lane-that the application of current requirements
invalidated the trusts of those who moved into Florida from other states.75
Instead, the instant court looked only at the additional language and concluded that in an attempt to conform further to the Restatement (Second)

64. See generally Roth, supra note 29 (tracing the history of the attitude toward revocable trusts
and the corresponding law in Florida).
65. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. Lane allowed a settlor to retain multiple powers as long as the cumulative effect did not result in day-to-day control. Lane, 213 So. 2d at 303; see
supra note 23. However, as a carryover from Hanson, there was an implicit requirement in Lane to
comply with the Statute of Wills when such day-to-day control was retained. See Roth, supra note 29,
at 83. The interpretation in the instant case, by eliminating the requirement to comply with will execution formalities, eliminates the remains of Hanson. See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 664-67 (Grimes, S.,
dissenting).
66. See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 664.
67. See supra notes 25, 32 and accompanying text.
68. See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 664.
69. Id. at 665 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
70. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(2) (1969); see supra note 31.
71. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59; see infra text accompanying notes 79-83.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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of Trusts,76 the statute "unequivocally establishe[d] two alternative tests,
not a single test, to determine the validity of an inter vivos trust of which
the settlor is sole trustee."' The dissent's interpretation of section
689.075 is more persuasive because it evaluated the meaning of the language as a legislative response to court decisions and to potential problems with the law at the time.78
Not only is the dissent's interpretation more persuasive because it is
rooted in a factual context,79 but also because it results in a more logical
consequence.8" The majority's interpretation" leads to a tautology:
"'[a]n otherwise valid trust shall not be held invalid for any of the specified reasons, providing it is 'valid."'' 2 Under this view, the first test in
section 689.075(l)(g) is redundant because it only re-evaluates the validity
of the trust which has already been determined. 3 Additionally, this interpretation renders the alternative test requiring compliance with will execution formalities superfluous." Therefore, the instant court's interpretation
has the effect of reading subsection (1)(g) out of the statute and eliminating any special test of validity for trusts in which the settlor is sole trustee.
Consequently, any valid revocable trust is to be upheld by the court when
the reserved benefits and powers fall within subsections (1)(a) through (f).
The 1975 amendment further supports the dissent's conclusion that the
legislature intended continued compliance with will execution formalities
for those trusts created in Florida after July 1, 1969,." The elimination of
that requirement for trusts created prior to July 1, 1969, would be unnecessary if the 1971 amendment created two alternative tests as held by the
majority.86 Thus, there was no reason for the 1975 amendment unless the
legislature still intended the revocable trusts at issue to comply with will
execution formalities.87
The majority's elimination of the requirement to comply with will
execution formalities makes declarations of trust easier to create and encourages their use. In making its decision, the majority may have been
influenced by the widespread use of revocable trusts.88 In light of such
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
46-48.
87.
88.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.
See id. at 664-67 (Grimes. J., dissenting).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 666 (Grimes, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
See supra text accompanying note 58.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 666-67 (Grimes, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes
Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 667 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Jerome L. Wolf, Revocable Trusts-The Case for Statutory Reforms, FLA. BJ.,
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widespread use, the court may have wanted to make the advantages of
revocable trusts more accessible to Florida residents.
There are four commonly claimed advantages of revocable trusts.8 9
First, revocable trusts are often hailed as a means of avoiding the cost and
hassle of probate." The use of a revocable trust may also save attorney
fees associated with the making of a will, the payment of trustee commissions,9 and state probate costs. 92 However, unless the trust is fully funded and includes all assets in which the settlor has an interest, the benefit
of avoiding probate will not be realized.9' Also, a trust still involves postdeath administration costs,' and a trust, like a will, can be challenged
and defeated. 95 Although it may be more difficult to defeat a trust than a
will, the lack of a time limitation on such challenges may in fact make
trusts more vulnerable to attack. 96 However, when the decedent has left
assets in multiple jurisdictions, the revocable trust will be an advantageous
means of saving the expense of multiple probate proceedings.' Moreover, a revocable trust may be an effective means to limit or to reduce
completely the estate subject to the elective share.98
Second, avoiding the delay of probate is considered an advantage of
revocable trusts.' Theoretically, a successor trustee can begin distribution
to beneficiaries the moment after the settlor's death." However, in reality, trust assets may not be available for several weeks,'' and a delay
will occur if the trust is challenged."°e Thus, if speed of distribution is a
priority, trusts do have an advantage over probate, albeit somewhat

Nov. 1991, at 36 (discussing the effects of the proliferated use of revocable inter vivos trusts).
89. See, e.g., Bernard E. Jones, PuttingRevocable Trusts in Their Place, TR. & EST., Sept. 1990,
at 8, 20-21.

90. Id. at 20.
91. Karin J. Barkhorn, Wills and Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts: A Comparison, 211 PLI/Est. 237
(1992), available in WESTLAW. Trustee commissions are saved because the settlor is sole trustee. Id.
92. Burke A. Christensen, Revocable Living Trusts Offer Many Advantages, but the Saving of
FederalEstate Taxes Is Not One of Them, TR. & EsT., Dec. 1989, at 54, 55.
93. Barkhorn, supra note 91.
94. Jones, supra note 89, at 20. A trustee's post-death administrative duties include paying debts,
taxes, and expenses, conducting some types of inventory of the settlor's property, and distributing that
property to beneficiaries. Id. However, a paid trustee, rather than a paid executor, performs these duties. Id.
95. Barkhorn, supra note 91.
96. See Robert W. Elzer, Using a Revocable Trust to Minimize Probate Proceedings or Avoid
Them Entirely, 14 EST. PLAN. 286, 292 (1987).
97. Barkhorn, supra note 91.
98. See Ronald J. Russo & Peter T. Kirkwood, The Use of a Revocable Trust to Defeat the Elective Share, 57 FLA. BJ. 110 (1983).
99. Jones, supra note 89, at 20.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Elzer, supra note 96, at 292.
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overstated. 03
Privacy is a third benefit of the use of revocable trusts."° Because a
probated will must be filed in the public records, trusts offer an advantage
to those who do not want their dispositions made public.0 However,
this benefit is not absolute because trusts will also become part of the
public record if challenged."°
Fourth, revocable trusts are often used to plan for the incapacity of the
settlor.' 7 However, this benefit does not accompany the use of declarations of trust. In order to uphold a trust as valid, a third party trustee is
required to fund the trust, if unfunded at creation, and manage it after the
settlor's incapacity."0 ' In declarations of trust, the settlor is the sole trustee. Thus, the instant decision does not encourage the use of revocable
trusts for this purpose because the alternative tests only impact trusts in
which the settlor is the sole trustee.
Although the flexibility of revocable trusts offers some significant
advantages over estates, there are adverse tax consequences associated
with the use of this probate avoidance device." ° Because the settlor retains life income and control over the trust, the settlor is generally taxed
on all trust income during his lifetime."0 At the settlor's death, the trust
assets are considered part of the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes."' Thus, the settlor's transfer of assets into a revocable trust may defeat probate, but will not defeat the federal estate taxes associated with the
probate estate."' Furthermore, many favorable tax provisions which apply to estates do not apply to trusts." '3 The balance between the benefits
of flexibility and the costs of adverse tax consequences suggest that revocable trusts may be a viable supplement to an estate plan, but probably
should not become a substitute."4
It is worth noting that the majority's interpretation of section 689.075
makes the creation of revocable trusts easier," 5 and thus may encourage
the use of such probate avoiding devices. However, following the dissent's

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
ly/Aug.
114.
115.

Jones, supra note 89, at 20-21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Barkhorn, supra note 91.
Jones, supra note 89, at 18.
See id.
E.g., Christensen, supra note 92, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wallace Becker, Wills vs. Revocable Trusts: Tax Inequality Persists, PROB. & PROP., Ju1989, at 17, 19.
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 89, at 8.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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interpretation would not subject any property included in the trust to probate. It would only subject the trust creating process to the formalities of
will execution. Therefore, even if a fully funded declaration of trust were
executed in accordance with the formalities of a will, all the settlor's property would pass outside of probate. Thus, the majority's interpretation may
not necessarily increase the amount of property passing outside of probate.
The instant court recognized a trend toward upholding the validity of
revocable trusts.
However, in concluding that section 689.075(1)(g)
establishes two alternative tests to determine the validity of a trust where
the settlor is the sole trustee," 7 the instant court interpreted that subsection right out of the statute. The ultimate consequence of the instant decision may be to allow all property to pass at a settlor's death without conforming to Florida will execution formalities."' However, considering
the relative balance between benefits and drawbacks, it is unlikely that the
use of revocable trusts will completely supplant traditional estate planning."9 Thus, the majority's interpretation may only make a valuable
estate planning supplement more accessible.

116.
117.
118.
119.

See supra note 64.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
See Zuckennan, 615 So. 2d at 664.
See Jones, supra note 89, at 22.
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